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SAINTS AND SINNERS: IS AN INSURANCE 
POLICY REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY THE 
CHURCH FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY PRIESTS? 
Abstract: On September 19, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit’s holding in Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Inter-
state Fire & Casualty Co. created two circuit splits regarding the interpretation of 
Interstate Fire and Casualty Co.’s insurance policy provisions, particularly in the 
context of indemnification for sexual abuse settlements. Hartford held that in in-
surance policy interpretation the presence of an occurrence is determined by a 
subjective test of expectation from the standpoint of the insured. The Second Cir-
cuit also held that the assault and battery exclusion excluded only those insureds 
that committed the assault and battery, not all insureds on the policy. As a result, 
the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the Archdiocese and concluded that it was 
entitled to coverage for its claims. This Comment argues that the Second Cir-
cuit’s interpretation accurately applied the rules of insurance policy interpreta-
tion, as well as the rules of grammar, to correctly interpret these policy provi-
sions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The flurry of reports and lawsuits for sexual abuse by clergy around the 
country implicates religion in the larger realm of insurance policy interpreta-
tion.1 A contract is the manifestation of the mutual intent of the parties.2 Insur-
ance policies are standard form contracts that courts traditionally interpret ac-
cording to the rules for contract construction and interpretation.3 Courts are 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 905 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 
2018) (deciding whether an Archdiocese is entitled to indemnification from its insurance policy for mul-
tiple settlements for sexual abuse claims); Frequently Requested Church Statistics, CTR. FOR APPLIED 
RES. APOSTOLATE, https://cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-church-statistics/ [https://perma.
cc/F9ET-LN3A] (reporting the vast amount of sexual abuse by clergy). 
 2 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (2020). The aim of contract law is to realize the 
reasonable expectations of the parties based upon the agreement. Id. 
 3 See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (explaining that insurance policies are long stand-
ard form contracts and, unless ambiguous, are interpreted according to their plain meaning). Standard 
form contracts are “contracts of adhesion,” meaning that they are offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it 
basis” with no room to bargain for terms. Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as 
Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial Instru-
ments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 546 (2017). In some cases, the complexity of the contract itself is what 
leads to the use of standard form contracts as a way to decrease time and costs associated with con-
tract production. Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 73 
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cognizant, however, that insurance policyholders do not have the power or 
ability to negotiate and understand the terms of their insurance policies.4 As 
many forms of insurance are effectively mandatory, policyholders have mini-
mal leverage to negotiate with insurance providers.5 
In 2018, in Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & 
Casualty Co., the Second Circuit determined whether there was an occurrence 
that triggered coverage under an insurance policy.6 To determine whether there 
was an occurrence, the court first had to decide whether, based on the terms of 
the policy, the Archdiocese expected the injuries resulting from priests’ en-
                                                                                                                           
(2018). Thus, insurance policies are an example of contracts of adhesion, and insurers are typically the 
sole drafters of the policies. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of 
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 26 (1984). Insurance policies are contracts 
that are meant to provide financial reimbursement to an individual or an entity when they suffer a loss or 
pay damages. Insurance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Insurance policies are between 
the person contracting for protection—the insured—and the company guaranteeing that protection—the 
insurer. Understanding Your Insurance Policy, NAIC: CONSUMER ALERT, https://www.scc.virginia.gov/
boi/pubs/naic_und_plcy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M72B-96F5]; see infra note 45 and accompanying text 
(defining an insured). Policyholders purchase insurance for a variety of purposes, including health 
insurance, life insurance, and automobile insurance. See Insurance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
(listing the various types of insurance). Although insurance policy interpretation begins in the same 
manner as any contract, there are many aspects of insurance policies that make it difficult to consider 
them true manifestations of mutual intent. See W. World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 
(2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that courts interpret ambiguous terms in insurance policies where mutual 
intent is unclear to grant coverage); Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 130 
(Conn. 1995) (same); French, supra, at 546 (describing policyholders’ lack of bargaining power in 
drafting insurance policies). Some of these aspects include lack of negotiating power, lack of under-
standing, and lack of options. French, supra, at 546. Accordingly, courts have historically construed 
ambiguous terms in insurance policies strictly against the drafters, which are the insurers. Daniel 
Sanchez-Behar, Note, California’s Approach to the Interpretation of Insurance Policies—MacKinnon 
v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 577, 579 (2004). 
 4 See Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (not-
ing that all insurance policies are provided in the same non-negotiable manner with little bargaining 
power and similar coverage so consumers cannot pursue better terms elsewhere); French, supra note 
3, at 548−49, 551−52. Policyholders do not have the opportunity to read over the terms before pur-
chasing an insurance policy. Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insur-
ance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 
335, 363–64 (1998). Rather, it is only after the policyholder purchases and receives a copy of the 
policy that they may attempt to understand the terms they have agreed to. Id. Nevertheless, almost no 
one attempts to understand the complicated terms. Id. 
 5 Julia Kagan, Compulsory Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.investo-
pedia.com/terms/c/compulsory-insurance.asp [https://perma.cc/N7EB-APG3]. Mandatory contracts of 
adhesion occur when the law requires individuals to purchase insurance when taking part in a particu-
lar activity, such as compulsory insurance for automobiles or workers’ compensation. Id. Automobile 
insurance provides financial protection in the event of loss or damage. Insurance, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 3. Workers’ compensation insurance benefits workers injured at work by supplying 
them with support, such as payment for medical expenses and lost wages. What Is Workers’ Compensa-
tion?, NATIONWIDE, https://www.nationwide.com/lc/resources/small-business/articles/what-is-workers-
compensation-insurance [https://perma.cc/G344-SUBD]. 
 6 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93−94. 
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gagement in sexual abuse.7 In making this determination, the Second Circuit 
held that it should analyze expectation by a subjective test, from the standpoint 
of the insured.8 Hartford therefore created a circuit split with the Eighth Cir-
cuit, which applied an objective test.9 Furthermore, the Second Circuit also 
created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit by holding that an insurance poli-
cy’s assault and battery exclusion excluded only the insured that engaged in 
the assault and battery, rather than the entire class of insureds.10 
Part I of this Comment discusses the general rules of insurance policy in-
terpretation and the Hartford court’s affirmation that policies must be con-
strued according to their plain meaning.11 Part II explains the legal context sur-
rounding the interpretation of similar insurance policies that led to two circuit 
splits.12 Part III argues that the Second Circuit correctly interpreted the policy 
by the plain meaning of the terms in accordance with contract law.13 
I. INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION: THE NOT-SO-PLAIN MEANING 
Insurance policies are lengthy and complex standard form contracts that in-
volve a lack of bargaining power on behalf of policyholders in drafting the poli-
cies.14 The Second Circuit noted in Hartford the difficulty in interpreting policies 
according to the parties’ intentions and the terms’ plain meanings.15 It did so by 
holding that a subjective test is the proper test to determine whether a claim is an 
occurrence.16 The Second Circuit also broke with the Ninth Circuit by holding 
that an assault and battery exclusion in an insurance policy did not exclude the 
Archdiocese as a whole for liability stemming from the sexual misconduct of 
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id.; see infra note 39 and accompanying text (defining an occurrence). Sexual abuse is “unwant-
ed sexual activity” in which the victim fails to consent, is unable to consent, or is compelled physical-
ly. Sexual Abuse, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/sexual-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/
2UFL-24PA]; see infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text (outlining the repeated bouts of sexual 
abuse in both Hartford and Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1391 
(8th Cir. 1996) (Winona II)). 
 8 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 92−94; Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391. 
 9 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 92−94 (applying a subjective test to determine whether an incident 
was an occurrence); Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391 (holding that the proper test for the expectation of an 
occurrence is from the standpoint of a reasonable person). 
 10 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89−90; see Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Roman Catholic Church of the 
Diocese of Phoenix, 761 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the same assault and battery ex-
clusion precluded coverage for all of the insureds, not just the priests accused of sexual abuse); infra 
note 17 and accompanying text (defining and explaining the Archdiocese). The entire class of insureds 
refers to all of the people that the Archdiocese’s policy covers, such as the clergy, the bishops, and the 
staff. Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955. 
 11 See infra notes 14−62 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 63−113 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 114−138 and accompanying text. 
 14 See French, supra note 3 (defining standard form contracts). 
 15 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89−90. 
 16 Id. 
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priests.17 Section A of this Part describes the interpretation of insurance policies 
and how they relate to the general law of contracts.18 Section B of this Part out-
lines the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the policy in Hartford that led to two 
circuit splits.19 
A. Deciphering Insurance Policies and the Rules of Their Interpretation 
Insurance policies largely resemble other lengthy contracts, but due to the 
policyholders’ relative lack of participation in drafting the terms, courts con-
strue insurance policies differently.20 Not only do most policyholders not un-
derstand the policy prior to purchasing it, but once the policy is issued, policy-
holders rarely attempt to read or understand the terms.21 Even if policyholders 
attempted to understand the policy, drafters write most policies in such com-
plex and confusing manners that real comprehension is unlikely.22 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Id. at 92−93. An assault and battery exclusion is a clause in an insurance contract that explicitly 
states there is no coverage for assault and battery committed by the insured. Kimberly J. Winbush, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Assault and Battery Exclusion in Liability Insurance 
Policy at Issue, 44 A.L.R. 5th 91, § 2(a) (2019). Assault occurs when a person intentionally makes 
another fearful of an actual harm. Assault and Battery, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/
offenses/violent-crimes/assault-battery/ [https://perma.cc/V59Z-68HE]. Battery occurs when someone 
intentionally touches another without consent, and that touching is offensive or harmful. Id. “Archdio-
cese” and “diocese” are terms used in the Catholic faith to refer to geographical areas overseen by arch-
bishops and bishops, respectively. What Is the Difference Between a Diocese and Archdiocese? What 
About a Bishop and Archbishop?, CATHOLICSTRAIGHTANSWERS.COM, http://catholicstraightanswers.
com/what-is-the-difference-between-a-diocese-and-an-archdiocese-what-about-a-bishop-and-an-
archbishop/ [https://perma.cc/7Z8N-Y8L4]. An archdiocese covers a larger area than a diocese; archdi-
ocese is comparable to a city, whereas a diocese is like a town, and an archbishop or bishop, respec-
tively, oversees their area and the parishes and priests within it. Id. 
 18 See infra notes 20−42 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 43−62 and accompanying text. 
 20 French, supra note 3, at 546−49; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 2 cmt. h 
(AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017) (stating that although insurance policy interpretation is a 
category of contract law, the context is different and thus the rules diverge). Contracts of adhesion, such 
as insurance policies, are valid forms of standardized contracts wherein the non-drafting party cannot 
negotiate the language contained in the contract. See, e.g., Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco 
Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 653 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing contracts of adhesion). 
Contracts of adhesion are very common and almost inescapable in many industries today. Id. at 654. 
 21 Anderson & Fournier, supra note 4, at 363−64. Policyholders often continue to lack under-
standing of the terms of their policy after purchase because policies tend to be complex and confusing. 
See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 622−23 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1970) (describing the complex nature of insurance policies and corresponding challenge of compre-
hension). Due to the information imbalance, some courts have developed and applied a reasonable 
expectations doctrine that dictates that if a policyholder’s expectations were objectively reasonable, a 
court should rule in favor of the insured. See, e.g., In re Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig., 
107 F. Supp. 2d 841, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 22 French, supra note 3, at 548−49. State courts have commented on the complexity of insurance 
policies. See id. at 549 (citing Storms v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978)) (de-
scribing insurance policies as incomprehensible because of their wordiness). For example, the Court 
of Appeals of Kentucky described insurance policies as confusing puzzles and opined that even me-
2020] Insurance Policy Indemnification for Wrongful Acts by Priests II.-285 
Due to its complexity, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a ques-
tion of law for a court to decide.23 To interpret insurance policy terms as they 
apply to the specific claim being made, courts employ the plain meaning 
rule.24 The plain meaning rule gives a term its most literal explanation.25 Under 
this rule, the court generally does not consider evidence that is outside the four 
corners of the insurance policy unless the evidence shows that a reasonable 
policyholder would give it a more legitimate meaning than the obvious one.26 
Contracts, including insurance policies, are meant to be the final manifestation 
of the agreement.27 Thus, if the meaning is readily understandable, the court 
will not look further than the contract itself.28 If, however, the language is rea-
sonably susceptible to more than one meaning, and the mutual intent of the 
parties is indeterminable, courts may apply the doctrine of contra proferentem, 
which requires the court to construe the disputed term against the drafter.29 A 
                                                                                                                           
ticulous examination would not provide clarity. See id. at 449−50 (citing Universal Underwriters, 451 
S.W.2d at 622−23) (reasoning that insurers try to convince customers that coverage is comprehensive, 
and courts that coverage is limited).  
 23 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 2; see also Sanchez-Behar, supra note 3, at 577 (ex-
plaining that courts often wrestle with insurance policy interpretation, which leads to variation in results). 
Questions of law are questions that a judge must determine as opposed to a jury. Question of Law, 
LAW.COM, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1704 [https://perma.cc/8SF9-ELQ4]. 
 24 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3 (providing that the court will not take into 
account evidence outside of the language of the policy to prove a term is ambiguous unless it shows a 
reasonable policyholder would interpret it differently). In recognition of the unequal bargaining pow-
er, the courts apply a strict liability standard that always finds in favor of insureds and against insurers 
when there are ambiguities within the language. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy 
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 538 (1996); Strict Liability, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_liability [https://perma.cc/3UT9-TQ7Q]. The strict liability standard avoids 
many of the issues that accompany negligence standards, which require drafting with only the care of 
a typical drafter. Abraham, supra, at 538; Negligence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/negligence [https://perma.cc/2T5L-VWAN]. 
 25 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3. 
 26 Id. 
 27 MURRAY, supra note 2, § 1.1. 
 28 Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 405 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Lerner v. 
Gudelsky Co., 334 S.E.2d 579, 584 (Va. 1985)). Pacific Insurance Co. v. America National Fire In-
surance Co., before the Fourth Circuit in 1998, involved a claim for reimbursement after a former 
employee sued his former company, Rail Link, for severe injuries sustained while working. Id. at 399. 
The insurers claimed that the policies did not cover this type of claim. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that 
the language of the exclusion explicitly excluded claims brought under the specific employment laws 
at issue in Pacific. Id. at 406. Some scholars suggest emphasizing an area of law called contract dis-
cretionary power that supports opening up the standard form portions of contracts that are consistent 
across policies to the discretion of the law, thus allowing the court to determine the contract’s mean-
ing. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive 
Contracting by Standard Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 870–76. 
 29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see RESTATEMENT OF 
THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 4 (providing that in the event of an ambiguous term, courts interpret it against 
the drafter unless extrinsic evidence proves that result unreasonable); see also Abraham, supra note 
24, at 538 (explaining that construing ambiguous terms in favor of insureds avoids many issues that 
would accompany a negligence standard). The contra proferentem doctrine addresses multiple concerns 
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court’s approach to interpreting insurance policies often takes the nature of 
contracts of adhesion into account by strictly construing ambiguous language 
against the insurer.30 By implementing the contra proferentem approach, courts 
encourage policy drafters to clearly outline coverage.31 
When interpreting insurance policies, courts consider each term to guar-
antee its effectiveness.32 Courts believe that if the parties included a term with-
in a policy, it must have been for a specific purpose.33 Taking into account the 
complex nature of insurance policies, courts limit the application of exclusion-
ary clauses.34 The purpose of exclusionary clauses is twofold: (1) to incentiv-
ize the insured to guard against risk of moral hazard, and (2) to prevent the 
insurer from having to cover the insured’s wrongdoing.35 Accordingly, courts 
                                                                                                                           
that courts express regarding insurance policy interpretation, including the imbalance of understanding 
between the parties to the contract, inability of policyholders to pursue better terms, and lack of mutual 
intent between parties due to non-negotiable terms. French, supra note 3, at 553, 546, 559. This doctrine 
generally results in construing inclusions of coverage expansively and exclusions, or limitations, modest-
ly. Id. at 554−55. See Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839 N.W.2d 749, 755 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that contra proferentem applies when there are ambiguous terms because 
insurance policies employ intricate terms, but policyholders are generally inexperienced). 
 30 Abraham, supra note 24, at 538; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 2 cmt. a 
(describing the approach that courts take when interpreting insurance policies). Strict construction is a 
strict liability standard by which the meaning of ambiguous language that favors the policyholder 
prevails because the policyholder did not have power in drafting the policy. Abraham, supra note 24, 
at 538. 
 31 French, supra note 3, at 556. 
 32 See, e.g., Buell Indus. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 791 A.2d 489, 497–98 (Conn. 2002) 
(quoting Hansen v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 687 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Conn. 1996) (emphasizing the im-
portance of each clause within an insurance policy)). The case Buell Industries v. Greater New York 
Mutual Insurance Co., in the Supreme Court of Connecticut in 2002, involved an environmental claim 
regarding contaminated sites. Id. at 492. Buell Industries sought indemnification from its insurance 
companies, but they denied coverage due to a pollution exclusion. Id. at 493–94. The court interpreted 
the policy according to its plain meaning, giving each clause an operative meaning, and held that the 
pollution exclusion barred coverage. Id. at 510. Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., decided by 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut in 1996, was a dispute about an underinsured motorist’s policy. 687 
A.2d at 1262. There, the policy’s language was ambiguous so the court construed the policy against 
the insurer. Id. at 1267. 
 33 See Buell, 791 A.2d at 497–98 (quoting Hansen, 687 A.2d at 1267) (stating that every policy 
term must have an effect). 
 34 Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 768 (Cal. 1982). Courts construe clauses that grant 
coverage more expansively. Id. An example of a clause granting, rather than excluding, coverage is: 
“We will pay all sums the ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the 
owner or driver of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle.’ The damages must result from ‘bodily injury’ sus-
tained by the ‘insured’ caused by an ‘accident.’” Hansen, 687 A.2d at 1267. In contrast, an exclusion-
ary clause is: “This coverage does not apply: (a) To liability of any Assured for assault and battery 
committed by or at the direction of such Assured except liability for Personal Injury or Death resulting 
from any act alleged to be assault and battery for the purpose of preventing injury to persons or dam-
age to property.” Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88. 
 35 Arrigo’s Fleet Serv., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 221 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1974). Insurers object to indemnifying policyholders for their own wrongdoing because insurance is 
meant to provide protection for loss that is not expected. See Insurance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 3 (stating that insurance provides protection for a contingency, which is an event that is 
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interpret any unclear terms in exclusionary clauses against the insurance com-
pany.36 
Moreover, based on the terms of an insurance policy, claims must qualify 
as occurrences to be covered.37 Commercial liability policies routinely contain 
occurrence requirements to ensure that insurers indemnify only claims based 
on accidents or unintended events, rather than the wrongful acts of the in-
sured.38 Events that qualify as occurrences must be accidents that insureds did 
not expect or intend.39 Thus, expectation is relevant, because if an event was 
expected, it may not be an accident and therefore would not be covered.40 
When considering expectation, a court may consider whether the insured ex-
pected either the incident or the resulting injury.41 Thus, whether the court ap-
plies an objective or a subjective standard guides the court’s determination on 
whether the accident was expected.42 
B. The Insurance Policy in Hartford and the Issues  
Creating the Circuit Splits 
In 2018, in Hartford, the Second Circuit interpreted an insurance policy to 
determine whether indemnification was appropriate.43 Specifically, the Second 
Circuit considered who was protected as an insured under a policy of the 
Archdiocese of Hartford, Connecticut.44 An insured, or assured, is an individu-
                                                                                                                           
possible, but not certain, to occur). If a policyholder expects the harm, it would not align with the 
purpose of contracting for the insurance policy and thus should be beyond the scope. See id. But cf. 
Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89 (holding that applying the exclusion to all people covered by the policy 
would be contrary to the intention of an exclusion). A moral hazard is a “hazard that has its inception 
in mental attitudes, such as dishonesty, carelessness, and insanity.” Hazard, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 3. Applied in the insurance context, a moral hazard could ultimately allow the insured 
to unjustly collect under the policy. Id. 
 36 Arrigo’s, 221 N.W.2d at 209–10. Arrigo’s involved an incident where, while undergoing re-
pairs, a fire damaged cargo within a truck’s trailer. Id. at 208. The Michigan Court of Appeals held the 
language of the policy exclusion at issue to be ambiguous and ruled against the insurer. Id. at 212. 
 37 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 90. 
 38 Winbush, supra note 17, § 2(b). 
 39 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 90. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. at 93 (focusing on whether the injury was expected). But see Diocese of Winona v. 
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1407, 1416 (D. Minn. 1994) (Winona I) (stating the issue was 
whether the abuse was expected). 
 42 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 90 (applying an objective test rather than a subjective test to deter-
mine the insured’s expectation); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 2 cmt. h (describing insur-
ance policy interpretation as a question of law for the court to decide); French, supra note 3, at 
546−49 (explaining the extremely complex nature of insurance policies). 
 43 905 F.3d at 90. Indemnification is the purpose of insurance—to provide compensation for loss 
or damage. Indemnification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3. 
 44 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 90. 
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al whose liabilities will be indemnified by the policy.45 The Archdiocese’s 
maintained an insurance policy with Interstate between September 1978 and 
September 1985.46 By June 2008, the Archdiocese notified Interstate of four 
lawsuits against priests for sexual misconduct that took place during the policy 
term.47 The four claims in question were against three priests within the Arch-
diocese: Father Robert Ladamus, Father Stephen Crowley, and Father Ivan 
Ferguson.48  
Between May 2010 and May 2012, the Archdiocese reached settlements 
for all four claims and requested coverage under the policy with Interstate.49 
Of the four, the insurance company only challenged one of the claims against 
the priests on the basis that the claim did not qualify as an occurrence.50 Inter-
state also disputed that the policy covered any of the four claims because they 
fell under an assault and battery exclusion in the insurance policy.51 The par-
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Insured, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3 (defining an insured as someone an in-
surance policy protects and noting the synonymous term “assured”). 
 46 Appellee’s Principal & Response Brief at 1, Hartford, 905 F.3d 84 (Nos. 16-2999(L), 17-
2484(XAP)). The Archdiocese maintained multiple policies in the form of excess indemnity policies 
that different liability amounts triggered. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire 
& Cas. Co., 199 F. Supp. 3d 559, 563–64 (D. Conn. 2016). For example, in Hartford, the Archdiocese 
was self-insured up to $60,000 from 1978 to 1981 and $100,000 after 1981. Id. at 563 n.1. If a settle-
ment exceeded that value, the first two insurance companies would cover the excess up to $200,000. 
Id. Finally, if it exceeded $200,000, Interstate was responsible for covering the remaining amount up 
to $5 million. Id. 
 47 See Appellee’s Principal & Response Brief, supra note 46, at 14−17 (describing the claims 
against the priests that the Archdiocese employed). 
 48 Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 565. Father Ferguson was the alleged assailant for two of the 
claims. Id. Each claim took place at some point between 1977 and 1985. Id. 
 49 Appellee’s Principal & Response Brief, supra note 46, at 14−17. The settlements for the four 
claims were $295,000, $299,000, $750,000, and $775,500. Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 615. 
 50 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 91; see supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining that to be an 
occurrence under the policy the insured must not intend or expect the accident). Interstate conceded 
that one of the four claims was an occurrence, and based on its conclusions of fact, the court held that 
the second was also an occurrence because the Archdiocese had no prior reports about Fathers Lada-
mus or Crowley. Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 595. For the first claim against Father Ferguson, the 
court concluded that the priests who were aware of his tendencies to sexually abuse children were not 
sufficiently high in the church’s hierarchy to qualify as the Archdiocese’s proxy. Id. at 596. The court 
held it would be unfair to impute a priest’s knowledge onto the Archdiocese as a whole because, in the 
hierarchy, there are many priests below a particular archbishop. Id. 
 51 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88. The assault and battery exclusion said there was no coverage for assault 
and battery “of any Assured” that was “committed by or at the direction of such Assured.” Id. (emphasis 
added); Appellee’s Principal & Response Brief, supra note 46, at 11. The practice of excluding assault 
and battery from insurance coverage is based on the idea that a person should not be indemnified for that 
person’s own wrongful actions. Winbush, supra note 17, § 2(a)–(b). When there have been wrongful 
actions, insurance companies likely prefer to preclude coverage for all insureds. See Alan O. Sykes, The 
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related 
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569–70 (1988) (explaining that an employer’s vicarious liabil-
ity for employees’ wrongdoing helps to ensure payment and also induce employers to better control em-
ployees’ behavior). In this way, an assault and battery exclusion may serve as an incentive to ensure that 
employees or other insureds do not commit assault and battery, thereby creating an overall deterrent 
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ticular exclusion in Interstate’s policies precluded coverage for the liability of 
“any Assured” for assault committed by “such Assured.”52 
On November 19, 2012, the Archdiocese filed a complaint in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Connecticut against Interstate for its failure to 
indemnify and asserted multiple claims, including breach of contract and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.53 Interstate denied all 
claims and asserted fourteen affirmative defenses for the denial of coverage, 
including: lack of an occurrence because the acts were expected or intended, 
lack of coverage for the underlying claims based on the relevant policy terms, 
and preclusion of coverage based on the assault and battery exclusion.54 The 
district court held, by applying the subjective test, that Interstate was liable for 
                                                                                                                           
effect. See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93–94 (ruling against Interstate’s argument that the Archdiocese “should 
have known” the abuse would continue and noting that the Connecticut Supreme Court in Capstone 
Building Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 67 A.3d 961 (Conn. 2013), has rejected the “should 
have known” standard); Sykes, supra, at 569–70 (explaining an employer’s economic incentive to close-
ly monitor employees to decrease the number of lawsuits). Generally, however, exclusions that bar cov-
erage due to assault do not apply to an insured that was only vicariously liable for the assault, such as an 
employer, but who did not actually commit the assault. Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth That 
Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
65, 90 (2012). Vicarious liability is the liability of someone in their capacity as a supervisor. Vicarious 
Liability, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vicarious_liability [https://perma.cc/
C8FA-TSFQ]. 
 52 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88. The policy, in Hartford, was in the name of the Archdiocese and it 
said insurance does not apply “to liability of any Assured for assault and battery committed by or at 
the direction of such Assured.” Id. at 88–89 (emphasis added) An insured under the policy included 
any employee of the Archdiocese that worked in an organization of the Archdiocese and acted in the 
scope of such position. Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955. The Second Circuit noted that, as the priests were 
acting outside of the scope of their employment when they committed the sexual abuse, they were 
likely not insureds under the policy at that time. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89. In fact, the court suggested 
that Interstate should stand by its own interpretation of the contract, because in its denial of coverage 
letter to the Archdiocese, Interstate pointed out that the priests were acting beyond the scope of their 
position and should not be considered insureds. Id. If the priests were not considered insureds when 
acting outside the scope of their positions, their sexual assaults could not have triggered the exclusion 
because the exclusion only applied to acts of insureds. See id. at 88–89 (stating that the wording of the 
exclusion only excluded coverage to insureds who committed an assault). The Second Circuit consid-
ered the priests to be insureds under the policy, similar to employees under an employer’s insurance poli-
cy. Id. at 89. 
 53 Complaint at 11−13, Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d 559 (No. 3:12cv01641). A breach of contract 
claim arises when a party has broken a term of the contract or has left a promise unperformed. Breach 
of Contract, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/breach_of_contract [https://perma.
cc/H342-RRFA]. Breach of good faith and fair dealing refers to a requirement that is implied within 
all contracts that parties will uphold the contract and treat each other appropriately. Implied Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/implied_
covenant_of_good_faith_and_fair_dealing [https://perma.cc/4CQP-W6WM]. The Archdiocese also 
asserted a claim against Interstate for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act and 
the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Complaint, supra, at 14−18. The district court found for 
Interstate and the Second Circuit affirmed in respect to these claims. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 94–97; Hart-
ford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 615–16. 
 54 Answer & Affirmative Defenses at 8–12, Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d 559 (No. 3:12cv01641). 
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failing to reimburse the Archdiocese for the four settlements relating to the 
sexual assaults that the three priests allegedly committed.55 Specifically, the 
court questioned whether, from the viewpoint of the Archdiocese, there was a 
substantial probability that the Archdiocese knew that the abuse would likely 
continue, therefore making the injuries expected.56 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Interstate argued that (1) the district 
court’s construction of the policy was incorrect, (2) the proper standard for 
determining whether there was an occurrence is an objective test, and (3) the 
court should have followed the Connecticut Superior Court’s decision in 1995 
in Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp.57 In Linemaster, 
the court held that although the test is generally subjective, in certain extraor-
dinary situations it should become an objective test.58 If the objective test ap-
plied, the court would consider the expectation of the sexual assaults from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable Archdiocese, rather than from the viewpoint of the 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 594, 615; see infra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining the 
difference between the subjective and objective tests). The fourth claim, involving the second allega-
tion against Father Ferguson, was the sole claim on appeal regarding whether there was an occurrence. 
Hartford, 905 F.3d at 91. Father Ferguson was the only priest that the Archdiocese had prior 
knowledge of committing past sexual abuse. Id. For the second claim against Father Ferguson, which 
allegedly began in the summer of 1981, Interstate challenged the claim’s status as an occurrence because 
the Archdiocese received a report of a different instance of Father Ferguson’s sexual abuse in March of 
1979. Id. The report made against Father Ferguson in March 1979 corresponded to the first claim 
against him. Id. As it was the first report of Father Ferguson’s sexual abuse, it was not expected by the 
Archdiocese and therefore qualified as an occurrence. Id. Therefore, Interstate argued that because the 
Archdiocese was under notice of Father Ferguson’s sexual misconduct, the Archdiocese should have 
expected the subsequent incident. Id. The court, however, found that the Archdiocese reasonably relied 
on the opinion of Father Ferguson’s doctor that Father Ferguson would abstain from sexual miscon-
duct. Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 597. The doctor formed his opinion based on Father Ferguson’s 
admittance of the incidents and confession that he was an alcoholic. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 91. Due to 
this revelation, Father Ferguson underwent treatment. Id. After treatment, the doctor concluded that as 
long as Father Ferguson refrained from alcohol, he would refrain from sexual misconduct. Id. 
 56 Hartford, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 594. 
 57 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 94; Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-
03964325, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2229, at *70 (July 25, 1995). 
 58 See Linemaster, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2229, at *69−70 (holding that a subjective test can 
be replaced with an objective test when there are exceptional circumstances). In considering whether 
there are exceptional circumstances, courts look to factors such as the duration of the act, or if the act 
was intentional such that subjective intent is clear from the circumstances themselves. In Linemaster, 
Linemaster sued its insurance company for failure to defend Linemaster pursuant to the insurance 
policy in an action brought by the EPA. Id. at *1. In applying the plain meaning to the terms of the 
insurance policy, the Superior Court of Connecticut held that there was no duty to defend according to 
the terms because there was no suit pending. Id. at *112. Similarly, in Hartford, Interstate argued that 
there were exceptional circumstances and, therefore, that the court should apply an objective test and 
the incidents of sexual abuse should not be occurrences. 905 F.3d at 94. (citing Linemaster, 1995 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2229, at *70). The court in Hartford, however, declined to recognize an excep-
tional circumstance and refused to apply an objective test in this case. Id. 
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Archdiocese in question.59 Interstate attempted to use the Archdiocese’s ruling 
of recklessness from a prior civil suit involving Father Ferguson’s sexual abuse 
of another boy as proof of knowledge or expectation.60 The court rejected this 
argument and concluded that it was acceptable for the Archdiocese to rely on a 
doctor’s opinion that Father Ferguson would not regress to sexual abuse.61 
Thus, in Hartford, the court’s determination on whether the claims were occur-
rences and whether the assault and battery provision excluded coverage creat-
ed the circuit splits.62 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT OF HARTFORD’S INSURANCE POLICY CONSTRUCTION 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan 
Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. created a circuit split with the Eighth 
Circuit regarding what constitutes an occurrence under identical Interstate Fire 
& Casualty Co. insurance policies, and with the Ninth Circuit over the con-
struction and interpretation of the assault and battery exclusion.63 Part A dis-
cusses the split with the Eighth Circuit regarding the proper test for an occur-
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93 (holding that the district court was correct to apply a subjective 
test from the standpoint of the insured); Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391 (stating that the proper question 
was whether a reasonable person in the position of the church would have expected the abuse to con-
tinue). 
 60 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93. Recklessness occurs when an actor does not intend any negative 
result, but is aware of its possibility and proceeds regardless. Recklessness, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 3. Interstate argued that there was no occurrence because the Archdiocese should 
have expected the injury due to its conscious decision to ignore the risk and allow Father Ferguson to 
continue having close interactions with children. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93. 
 61 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 92. Father Dr. Peterson, a psychiatrist, oversaw Father Ferguson’s treat-
ment for substance abuse. Id. at 91. He reasoned that Father Ferguson’s alcohol abuse caused his pe-
dophilia; therefore, if he no longer struggled with alcohol abuse, then he could resist the pedophilia. 
Id.  
 62 Id. at 94. 
 63 See Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 905 F.3d 84, 
89−90, 93 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying a subjective test to determine the insured’s expectation and hold-
ing that an assault and battery exclusion applied only to the insureds that committed the assault); In-
terstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix, 761 F.3d 953, 955 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that an assault and battery exclusion prohibited coverage for all insureds under the 
policy); Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. (Winona II), 89 F.3d 1386, 1391 (8th Cir. 
1996) (applying an objective test to determine whether a reasonable insured would have expected the 
sexual abuse). All three cases revolved around the construction of identical provisions, yet the courts 
came to opposite conclusions. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89−90; Interstate, 761 F.3d at 954−55; Winona 
II, 89 F.3d at 1391. Insurance policy interpretation, as with all contracts, is a question of law for the 
court. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88. Courts must give the terms in the policy their ordinary meaning and 
try to determine the intent of the parties with respect to coverage. Id. The burden is on the insurer to 
prove that an exclusion denies coverage under the policy. Id. 
II.-292 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
rence under the policies at issue.64 Part B discusses the various interpretations 
of the assault and battery exclusion by the Second and Ninth Circuits.65 
A. Expectation of Occurrence—Objective and Subjective Tests 
Courts struggle with whether to apply an objective test or a subjective test 
to determine whether there was an expected occurrence.66 The language in in-
surance policies dictates that to be an occurrence, the insured must not have 
intended or expected the policy to cover it.67 Courts approach this question in 
two different ways: (1) they assess expectation objectively based on a reasona-
ble person standard or (2) subjectively based on the viewpoint of the insured.68 
The policy in Hartford defined occurrence as an unfortunate incident that “un-
expectedly and unintentionally results in personal injury.”69 In Hartford, Inter-
state did not suggest that the Archdiocese intended any of the abuses to occur; 
rather, Interstate suggested that the Archdiocese should have expected Father 
Ferguson’s abuse based upon prior knowledge.70 Thus, Interstate argued that 
the abuse should not be an occurrence.71 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See infra notes 66–89 and accompanying text (explaining the circuit split regarding the proper 
test to apply to determine an insured’s expectation). 
 65 See infra notes 90–113 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split regarding the proper 
scope of an assault and battery exclusion). 
 66 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 90; Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391. Sexual abuse cases are not the only in-
stances where courts consider an objective or subjective test. See Morton Int’l v. Gen. Accident Ins. 
Co., 629 A.2d 831, 833−34 (N.J. 1993) (holding, in an environmental damages claim case, that the 
test of expectation for an occurrence is subjective); James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Ky. 1991) (same). 
 67 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 92; Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391; see Winbush, supra note 17, § 2(b) (ex-
plaining that insurance should not be available for improper actions by the insured). 
 68 Compare Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391 (stating the question of expectation is, objectively, wheth-
er a reasonably prudent person in the insured’s position knew or should have known), with Hartford, 
905 F.3d at 93 (holding the test for expectation is, subjectively, whether the insured expected the re-
sulting injury). In Hartford, Interstate also argued that to be an occurrence, the incident, or event, 
itself should have been unexpected. 905 F.3d at 92. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the appro-
priate consideration is whether the injury was expected, not the event. Id. at 92−93; see also Winona 
II, 89 F.3d at 1391 (requiring an occurrence to result in an unexpected injury). But see Pa. Gen. Ins. 
Co. v. Thakur, No. 3:12CV1799(AWT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110404, at *9–10 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 
2014) (defining an occurrence as an unexpected or unintended incident, rather than an unexpected or 
unintended injury). 
 69 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 90. 
 70 Id. at 91. 
 71 Id.; see also Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. (Winona I), 858 F. Supp. 1407, 
1409−13 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding that a reasonable person in the Diocese’s position would have been 
aware of the risk of continued abuse). Hartford differed slightly from the Winona case to the extent 
that a doctor linked Father Ferguson’s proclivity towards sexual abuse to his alcoholism; whereas in 
Winona I, no similar explanation existed. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 596–97. Contra Winona I, 858 
F. Supp. at 1410 (accepting Father Adamson’s sexual orientation disturbance and noting a simple 
inability to control his urges). 
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Hartford created a circuit split between the Second and Eighth Circuits 
regarding the proper test, objective or subjective, to determine whether the in-
sured expected the incident.72 In 1996, in Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire 
& Casualty Co. the Eighth Circuit addressed claims involving a priest that 
committed numerous sexual abuses during a period of over two decades.73 The 
main issue in Winona was whether the Diocese and Archdiocese expected the 
abuse to continue.74 The court determined the expectation by using an objec-
tive test from the standpoint of a prudent policyholder.75 
In Winona, the Eighth Circuit employed an objective test for expectation 
of an occurrence and determined that the Archdiocese should have expected 
the sexual abuse would continue.76 Specifically, the court considered whether a 
reasonably prudent person in the insured’s position would have expected the 
abuse.77 Thus, the court asked whether the Diocese and Archdiocese knew or 
should have known that there was a substantial probability that the priest, Fa-
ther Thomas Adamson, would sexually abuse a boy who attended his church.78 
In Winona, the Diocese knew that Father Adamson had sexually abused young 
boys intermittently between 1964 and 1984, leading to six confirmed incident 
reports.79 Interstate argued that the Diocese and Archdiocese should have 
known, therefore, that there was a substantial probability that the abuse would 
occur.80 Nevertheless, throughout this period, Father Adamson went through 
various bouts of therapy and treatment, both inpatient and outpatient, in an at-
tempt to prevent further incidents.81 The Diocese argued that, based on the ex-
tensive treatment and therapy, it assumed Father Adamson was cured and 
therefore it did not expect continued abuse.82 The Eighth Circuit concluded 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93; Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391. 
 73 Winona I, 858 F. Supp. at 1409−13. 
 74 Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Winona I, 858 F. Supp. at 1409−13. The first confirmed report involving Father Adamson came 
in 1964. Id. at 1409. When the Diocese confronted Father Adamson, he vowed to stop, and the Dio-
cese transferred him to a different school. Id. Then, in 1966 or 1967, when the Diocese received a 
second report, Father Adamson underwent a few months of counseling, and the Diocese transferred 
him again. Id. at 1409–10. A third incident in early 1974 led to both out-patient and in-patient psycho-
therapy. Id. at 1410. A fourth report came later the same year and eventually led to Father Adamson 
losing his position at the congregation. Id. The Diocese transferred him and he underwent further 
therapy. Id. The fifth and sixth incidents occurred in 1980 and 1983, which led to further treatment 
and another transfer. Id. at 1411–12. In addition, Father Adamson had maintained a sexual relation-
ship with a boy beginning in 1979, when the boy was thirteen, and continuing until 1987. Id. at 1412. 
 80 Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391. 
 81 Winona I, 858 F. Supp. at 1410. 
 82 See id. (noting that Father Adamson’s therapist wrote that “it is unlikely he will regress to this 
behavior in the foreseeable future”). 
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that because the incidents happened repeatedly, the Diocese expected the abuse 
and, therefore, it was not an occurrence within the terms of the policy.83 
Hartford involved a similar set of facts, but the Second Circuit employed 
a subjective, rather than objective, test to determine whether insurance cover-
age was appropriate.84 In this case, the Archdiocese had received numerous 
reports that one of its priests, Father Ferguson, had sexual contact with young 
boys.85 Upon receiving a report on March 7, 1979, the Archdiocese was on 
notice of Father Ferguson’s prior abuse.86 The Archdiocese responded by send-
ing him to treatment, after which his psychiatrist informed the Archdiocese 
that as long as Father Ferguson controlled his alcoholism, it was safe to assign 
him to a boy’s school again.87 Because of the psychiatrist’s report, when the 
Second Circuit applied the subjective test, the court concluded that the Archdi-
ocese reasonably relied on the psychiatrist’s professional opinion that Father 
Ferguson would not resort to sexual abuse.88 Thus, unlike the Eighth Circuit, 
the Second Circuit held that the Archdiocese did not expect Father Ferguson to 
abuse again.89 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. at 1393–96. The court stated that although Father Adamson underwent treatment, he contin-
ued to inappropriately touch young boys, and the Diocese continued to receive reports of incidents. Id. 
at 1394. The court concluded it was clear that the Diocese was aware that it had yet to successfully 
treat Father Adamson, as the sexual abuse did not cease. Id. 
 84 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93 (stating that the district court correctly applied a subjective test). 
The Second Circuit’s approach in Hartford, notably, aligned with the majority of courts in insurance 
policy disputes when considering whether an insured expected an injury. See id. (noting that the Winona 
cases relied on Minnesota law to apply objective tests, but that Minnesota is an outlier); Linemaster 
Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-03964325, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2229, at 
*68–69 (July 25, 1995) (stating the majority rule is a subjective test for determining the insured’s 
expectations). The other cases that held the test to be subjective involved environmental damage 
claims. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 833−34, 879 (stating that courts will look into the insured’s subjec-
tive intent); James Graham Brown Found., 814 S.W.2d at 275, 278–79 (stating that the question for 
expectation was whether the insured had the subjective intent to cause harm). 
 85 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 91−92. The first reports of Father Ferguson’s abuse were made to pas-
tors. Id. at 91. The district court concluded that the pastors’ position within the Archdiocese was not 
enough to warrant treating their knowledge as the Archdiocese’s. Id. Thus, the court did not consider 
the Archdiocese to have known about Father Ferguson’s incidents of sexual abuse. 
 86 Id. at 91. 
 87 Id. at 92. Father Ferguson went to both an inpatient treatment program and then an outpatient 
program. Id. The treating psychiatrist concluded that his alcoholism caused the pedophilia, and, there-
fore, by ending his alcoholism, the sexual abuse would also cease. Id. 
 88 Id. Contra Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391–93 (applying the objective test and affirming that alt-
hough Father Adamson underwent repeated treatment, a reasonably prudent person would have ex-
pected the abuse to continue). Interstate argued that the question of the insured’s expectation should be 
whether the Archdiocese objectively expected the abuse, rather than the resulting injury. Hartford, 905 
F.3d at 92. Along these lines, Interstate urged the court to conclude that, due to the knowledge of 
Father Ferguson’s proclivities, a reasonably prudent person would believe that it was inevitable that 
he would resort to sexual abuse again. Id. The court rejected this argument based on the policy’s defini-
tion of occurrence as an accident that results in injury and also because the test should be subjective. Id. 
 89 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 92. Contra Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1391–93 (holding that the Diocese and 
Archdiocese expected the priest in question to abuse again). 
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B. The Assault and Battery Exclusion in Interstate’s Policies 
The decision in Hartford also created a circuit split between the Second 
and the Ninth Circuits regarding identical assault and battery exclusions in the 
context of sexual misconduct by priests.90 In 2014, in Interstate Fire & Casu-
alty Co. v. Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix, a case involving 
ongoing sexual abuse by a priest in Phoenix, Arizona, the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered the exact same policy form and exclusionary clause from the same in-
surance company as in Hartford.91 The policy exclusion denied coverage “to 
liability of any Assured for assault and battery committed by or at the direction 
of such Assured.”92 The circuits split over the scope of “any” and “such” be-
cause it would determine which insureds were denied coverage due to the as-
sault and battery exclusion.93 Although both Interstate and Hartford relied up-
on similar definitions of the word “such” when interpreting the policy, the cir-
cuits interpreted the exclusion differently.94 
In Interstate, the Diocese sought indemnification for four underlying set-
tlements.95 Interstate argued that the assault and battery exclusion applied to all 
four claims and barred coverage of the claims for the Diocese.96 The District 
Court granted the Diocese summary judgment stating that the assault and bat-
tery exclusion did not prevent coverage.97 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the District Court’s judgment by excluding coverage due to the assault 
and battery exclusion.98 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit read “such Assured” in 
the exclusion as referring back to “any Assured.”99 Further, according to the 
court, “any Assured” excluded coverage for all insureds, meaning the Diocese 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88; Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955. 
 91 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88; Interstate, 761 F.3d at 954–55. 
 92 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88; Interstate, 761 F.3d at 954. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits stated 
that “such” refers to whatever was just specified in the policy. Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89; Interstate, 
761 F.3d at 955. 
 93 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88; Interstate, 761 F.3d at 954. 
 94 Compare Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88−90 (concluding that the exclusion only applied to the in-
sureds that committed the assault and battery), with Interstate, 761 F.3d at 954−56 (concluding that 
the exclusion prevented coverage to all insureds under the policy). 
 95 Interstate, 761 F.3d at 954. The four settlements involved alleged abuse committed by two 
different priests, Father Henry Perez and Father John Giandelone. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-
Counterdefendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. at 11–12, Interstate, 761 F.3d 
953 (No. 12-17195, No. 12-17264, No. 13-15223). Claims alleged that the two abuses by Father Perez 
occurred between 1978 and 1981. Id. at 11. Further claims alleged that the two abuses by Father Gi-
andelone occurred between 1981 and 1985. Id. at 11–12. 
 96 Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955. The district court held that the assault and battery exclusion applied 
only to the insured that committed the assault and battery, rather than all of the insureds. Id. On ap-
peal, the insurance company argued that the court incorrectly interpreted the policy. Id. 
 97 Id. at 954–55. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
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as a whole.100 The Ninth Circuit considered the plain meaning of the terms 
“any” and “such” to determine the policy’s clearest meaning.101 The Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that the only term that “such” could refer to was “any As-
sured” because it had the “quality just specified.”102 To determine the meaning 
of “any Assured,” the court relied on Arizona case law holding that an exclu-
sion of “any insured” included all persons that the policy insures.103 Therefore, 
the court excluded coverage for the entire Diocese, rather than just the priest 
accused of sexual abuse.104 
In Hartford, Interstate attempted to use the Ninth Circuit’s holding re-
garding the same insurance policy language to its advantage.105 Interstate ar-
gued that the Ninth Circuit correctly held that “such Assured” in the assault 
and battery exclusion referred back to “any Assured,” and therefore the clause 
excluded coverage for all insureds.106 Interstate argued that the term “any As-
sured” meant that the coverage excluded the entire Diocese, rather than only 
the priests alleged to have committed the sexual abuses.107 The Second Circuit, 
however, disagreed with this reading of the exclusion.108 The court concluded 
that the word “such” should be read as limiting that class of insureds to which 
the exclusion applied.109 By limiting the class, the court prohibited the exclu-
sion from applying to all insureds.110 Rather, the exclusion only applied to the 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on Brown v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 977 P.2d 807, 817 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998), and American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. White, 65 P.3d 449, 457 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003), which are two other Arizona cases, to reach this conclusion. See id. at 955–56 (con-
cluding that “the language ‘any insured’ express[es] a contractual intent to prohibit recovery by inno-
cent co-insureds”) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins., 65 P.3d at 457). In American Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co., in front of the Court of Appeals of Arizona in 2003, however, the exclusionary clause dif-
fered from the clause in Hartford. Compare Am. Family Mut. Ins., 65 P.3d at 452 (stating that there 
would be no coverage for any damages resulting from a criminal act “for which any insured is con-
victed”) (emphasis added), with Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88 (denying coverage for “any Assured for 
assault and battery committed by or at the direction of such Assured”) (emphasis added). 
 101 Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955. 
 102 Id.; see supra note 92 (defining “such” as having the quality just specified). 
 103 Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955; Am. Family Mut. Ins., 65 P.3d at 452; Brown, 977 P.2d at 817 
(stating that when a clause excluded recovery to “any insured” that included all insureds). 
 104 Interstate, 761 F.3d at 955. 
 105 905 F.3d at 89−90. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 90. Although Interstate cited some Connecticut case law where “any” was construed to 
exclude all of a class, the Second Circuit pointed out that the exclusionary clauses in those cases used 
dissimilar language than the one considered in Hartford. Id. See generally McWeeny v. City of Hart-
ford, 946 A.2d 862 (Conn. 2008) (analyzing the relationship between the terms “such individual” and 
“any individual” in Connecticut’s discriminatory employment practices statute). 
 109 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89. 
 110 Id. The court’s conclusion in Hartford is in line with the general rules of contract interpreta-
tion, which give each term a meaning. See Buell Indus. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 791 A.2d 489, 
497–98 (Conn. 2002) (quoting Hansen v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 687 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Conn. 1996)) 
(reasoning that each term should be effective because the drafters included each clause in an insurance 
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insureds that committed the assault and battery, which were the priests that 
committed sexual abuse.111 Because of this interpretation, the court concluded 
that the assault and battery committed by the priests triggered the assault and 
battery exclusion only for those individuals, not the entire Archdiocese.112 The 
Second Circuit attempted to follow the rules of insurance policy interpretation to 
interpret terms according to their plain meaning.113 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULING SUPPORTS CLEAR AND  
PURPOSEFUL INSURANCE POLICY DRAFTING 
Any court in interpreting an insurance policy will strive to give the provi-
sions of the policy their plain and ordinary meaning.114 In breaking from the 
Eighth Circuit regarding the proper viewpoint to consider expectation when 
defining an “occurrence,” the Second Circuit gave the terms defining an occur-
rence their ordinary meaning.115 Similarly, the Second Circuit broke with the 
Ninth Circuit regarding the interpretation of the assault and battery exclusion, 
when it gave the exclusion its ordinary meaning.116 The Second Circuit’s in-
surance policy interpretation correctly incentivizes insurance companies to 
employ more careful drafting.117 The Second Circuit based its decision in 
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. 
entirely upon the policy’s drafting.118 Under the policy, occurrences included 
the claims of sexual abuse at issue.119  
                                                                                                                           
policy for a reason); Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 450 (Tex. 2015) (explaining that 
each term in a contract should be given meaning). 
 111 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 89, 93. 
 114 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 2 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017). 
Insurance policy interpretation, like that of all contracts, is a question of law for the court to decide. 
Flint v. Universal Mach. Co., 679 A.2d 929, 932 (Conn. 1996). 
 115 Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 905 F.3d 84, 89–90 
(2d Cir. 2018); Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. (Winona II), 89 F.3d 1386, 1391 (8th 
Cir. 1996); Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 130 (Conn. 1995). 
 116 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89–90; Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Roman Catholic Church of the 
Diocese of Phoenix, 761 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2014); Heyman, 653 A.2d at 130. 
 117 See Heyman, 653 A.2d at 130 (stating that when provisions of insurance policies are not clear, 
then the court must use the interpretation that covers the loss); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Con-
text: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 40–41 (2014) (explaining 
that careful drafting can help to avoid costly litigation and unfavorable settlements if the meanings of 
the terms are contested). Furthermore, specifically for exclusionary clauses, the insurance company 
has the burden to prove that the exclusion applies to bar coverage. W. World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, 
Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 118 905 F.3d at 90−94. 
 119 Id. Following the traditional rules of contract construction, courts give all unambiguous terms 
their ordinary meanings and only consider extrinsic evidence when ambiguities exist. W. World, 922 
F.2d at 121; Heyman, 653 A.2d at 130; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 3. When interpret-
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As insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, the inquiry into the intent 
of the parties to an insurance policy should focus on what the policyholder ex-
pected to be covered and what the insurance company intended to be cov-
ered.120 Unfortunately, because insurance companies are the sole drafters of 
their policies, they control what is actually covered, usually by employing 
complex and confusing drafting techniques.121 In evaluating whether the 
claims at hand were occurrences, the Second Circuit determined that the Arch-
diocese must not have subjectively expected the resulting injury.122 The Sec-
ond Circuit correctly applied a subjective test from the standpoint of the in-
sured to determine the expectation of an occurrence.123 This aligns with the 
majority approach, and it is also in line with the bedrock principle that the par-
ties’ intentions should govern contract interpretation.124 
                                                                                                                           
ing the terms of a typical contract, the central question involves the parties’ intentions. Bank of the W. v. 
Superior Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992); Heyman, 653 A.2d at 130. 
 120 French, supra note 3, at 543; Slawson, supra note 3, at 26. With respect to an insurance poli-
cy, inquiring into the intent of the parties is slightly misleading because most insurance policy terms 
are not up for negotiation. French, supra note 3, at 543. Nonetheless, in a standard form contract, such 
as an insurance policy, the terms are enforceable as long as the parties have assented. Id. at 544. In 
regards to standardized agreements, it is acknowledged, and even endorsed, by the American Law 
Institute that individuals assent to terms they do not understand. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 211(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also Anderson & Fournier, supra note 4, at 363−64 (not-
ing that hardly anyone expects the owner of an insurance policy to have read the terms or to under-
stand the policy). The Restatement accounts for such lack of understanding by stating that the contract 
is assumed to treat people of comparable circumstances the same. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 211(1); see also Slawson, supra note 3, at 25–26 (explaining how the growth of standard 
form contracts has led consumers to agree to terms without understanding the implications). Although 
consumers typically do not understand what they are agreeing to when they enter into standard form 
contracts, consumers tend to have certain expectations as to what those agreements include. Slawson, 
supra note 3, at 26. Because one party has all of the drafting power, the party with the power can 
manipulate the contract in ways that lead to unexpected ramifications for the consumer. Id. 
 121 See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 622−23 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1970) (reasoning that insurers attempt to make customers believe more is covered than courts are 
willing to recognize); see also Rodriguez v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (La. 1978) 
(stating that many states are adopting anti-technical statutes to guard policyholders from confusing 
insurance policy terms); Lorang v. Fortis Ins. Co., 192 P.3d 186, 213 (Mont. 2008) (noting that even 
the most knowledgeable policyholders can be deluded by the intricacies of insurance policies). 
 122 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93. The Second Circuit based its decision on the policy’s definition of 
occurrence. See id. (stating that occurrences are events not intended or expected by the insureds). The 
issue of prior notice also weighed heavily in Winona because the priest in that case, Father Adamson, 
committed various confirmed sexual contacts with boys, yet the Diocese, and later the Archdiocese, 
forced him to undergo therapy and then placed him in a new school. Diocese of Winona v. Interstate 
Fire & Cas. Co. (Winona I), 858 F. Supp. 1407, 1409–13 (D. Minn. 1994). This repeated cycle of 
treatment and sexual abuse led the court to conclude that the Diocese and Archdiocese should have 
expected it to continue. Winona II, 89 F.3d at 1393–96. 
 123 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 92−94 (holding that intention and expectation should be considered 
from the insured’s position). 
 124 See id. at 93; Pa. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Thakur, No. 3:12CV1799(AWT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110404, at *9−10 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2014); Heyman, 653 A.2d at 130; Linemaster Switch Corp. v. 
Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-039643251995, Conn. Super. LEXIS 2229, at *69–70 (July 25, 
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Similarly, the Second Circuit correctly held that the assault and battery ex-
clusion only applied to the insureds who committed the assault and battery.125 
The assault and battery exclusionary clause in Hartford illustrates how insurance 
companies draft purposefully confusing and ambiguous policies.126 Through its 
drafting, Interstate made the exclusion appear limited in scope in a denial letter 
to the Archdiocese, but later argued that the exclusion could be read broadly by 
drafting it with nondescript adjectives like “any” and “such.”127 Insurance com-
panies utilize this type of confusing drafting to argue that a policy does not cover 
a particular claim.128 Insurance companies also argue that policies do not cover 
sexual abuse because the insurers believe they should not be responsible for the 
wrongful acts of the insureds.129 Furthermore, it is in society’s best interest to 
incentivize employers with the threat of an exclusion to ensure that their em-
ployees are not committing sexual assault.130  
Ironically, Interstate’s drafting led the court to hold that the policy required 
the insurance company to cover the claims in Hartford.131 In its interpretation, 
the Second Circuit began with the language of the policy to determine whether 
the policy required Interstate to indemnify the Archdiocese.132 By applying 
grammar rules to find the plain meaning of the words in the policy, the court de-
                                                                                                                           
1995). The Second Circuit correctly concluded, based on a simple reading of the policy clause, that the 
appropriate question is whether the Archdiocese expected the injury, rather than the abuse. See Hartford, 
905 F.3d at 93; SCOTT GODES & DAN MCGUIRE, 3 LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.01 (2019). The 
policy defined an occurrence as an accident that unexpectedly resulted in injury; therefore, the clearest 
understanding of the term is that the resulting injury must not be expected by the insured to be an occur-
rence and trigger coverage by the policy. See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 93. 
 125 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89. 
 126 See id. at 88; Universal Underwriters, 451 S.W.2d at 222–23 (stating that insurers draft poli-
cies so that they are susceptible to multiple readings). But see Gilson et al., supra note 117, at 40–41 
(explaining that there are financial reasons why drafters would be in a better position if they employed 
careful, explicit drafting). 
 127 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88–89. Nondescript drafting may be successful for the insurer, as long 
as it is clear enough that the court does not consider the language “ambiguous.” Id.; see Universal 
Underwriters, 451 S.W.2d at 222–23 (critiquing the use of ambiguous language in insurance policies 
that make them difficult to understand). If the language is ambiguous, however, or may be interpreted 
more than one way, it is construed strictly against the drafter of the policy, i.e. the insurer. Abraham, 
supra note 24, at 538. 
 128 French, supra note 3, at 548−49. 
 129 Winbush, supra note 17, § 2(b). 
 130 See Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational Incentives to Care About the Law, 60 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 39, 39–40 (1997) (explaining that the ability of an employer to control its employees’ 
conduct through incentives supports the application of vicarious liability); Sykes, supra note 51, at 
569–70 (articulating economic incentives of an employer to utilize certain tactics to ensure its em-
ployees are avoiding liability, such as close monitoring and compensation changes); supra note 51 and 
accompanying text (discussing the incentive for all employers to ensure that their employees are not 
committing sexual abuse if they know that the entire pool of insureds would not be covered in the 
event of a lawsuit or settlement). 
 131 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88–89. 
 132 See id. at 89−90 (analyzing the language and structure of the exclusion). 
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termined that the clause only excluded coverage for the insured who committed 
the assault and battery.133 In this case, the insureds who committed the acts were 
the priests responsible for the sexual abuse rather than the entire Archdiocese.134 
The Second Circuit appropriately interpreted the assault and battery exclusion 
according to the rules of interpretation by giving the clause its ordinary meaning 
and ensuring it served a purpose.135 Furthermore, if the court interpreted the ex-
clusion to exclude all insureds, insureds that had not committed sexual abuse 
would be excluded from coverage.136 Lastly, “such” is meant to exclude some-
thing specified from the whole, and it would have no limiting effect if it referred 
to the entire class of insureds.137 Thus, the Second Circuit correctly broke from 
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits and gave the terms of the insurance policy their 
plain meanings.138 
CONCLUSION 
In 2018, in Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & 
Casualty Co., the Second Circuit broke from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ 
interpretations of insurance policies with Interstate Fire and Casualty Co. The 
Second Circuit split with the Eighth Circuit regarding the test to determine 
whether an insured expected an “occurrence.” The Second Circuit ruled that 
the proper test is a subjective one, applied from the standpoint of the insured. It 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. at 89. 
 134 Id. The Second Circuit quickly dispensed with the issue of interpretation of the assault and 
battery exclusion on appeal by stating simply that “the rest is grammar.” Id. The Second Circuit also 
referenced the dissenting opinion written by Judge Dorothy W. Nelson in Interstate. Id. at 89−90; 
Interstate, 761 F.3d at 956−58 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson concluded that the definition of 
“such” meant “having the quality just specified.” Interstate, 761 F.3d at 956−57 (Nelson, J., dissent-
ing). She believed that the word “such” could be referring to three different groups: (1) the insureds at 
risk for liability, (2) the entire class of insureds, or (3) those insureds that carried out the assault. Id. 
Of those, the insured that committed the assault was the only one specified in the policy, and, there-
fore, that is who coverage should exclude. Id. at 957. 
 135 See Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89 (holding that each word of an insurance policy should be effec-
tive); W. World, 922 F.2d at 121 (same); Buell Indus., Inc. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 791 A.2d 
489, 497−98 (Conn. 2002) (same); Heyman, 653 A.2d 130 (same); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF 
LIAB. INS. § 3 (stating that insurance policy terms should be given their plain meaning). A clear read-
ing of the exclusionary clause illustrates that liability is not covered for the insured that the “assault 
and battery is committed by or at the direction of.” Hartford, 905 F.3d at 88−89. 
 136 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89.  
 137 Id.; see also Interstate, 761 F.3d at 957 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (stating that if “such” refers to 
all insureds, the exclusion is meaningless). It would be nonsensical for an exclusion to bar coverage 
for all insureds regardless of their innocence or guilt regarding the assault and battery. See Hartford, 
905 F.3d at 89. (explaining the purpose of “such” as a limitation). If that were the intent of the draft-
ers, they could have simply expressed that desire through clear and purposeful drafting. Id. The insur-
ers, however, drafted the policy in such a way to preserve their arguments against coverage in court. 
See Universal Underwriters, 451 S.W.2d at 622−23 (suggesting that insurers draft insurance policies 
in a way to persuade policyholders that the policy covers everything and courts that it covers nothing). 
 138 Hartford, 905 F.3d at 89, 93. 
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also held that the proper question was whether the insured expected the injury, 
rather than whether the insured expected the abuse that caused the injury. Fur-
thermore, the Second Circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in concluding that this 
assault and battery exclusion applied only to those insureds who committed the 
assault and battery, rather than to the entire class of insureds. The court 
reached these well-reasoned decisions by adhering to the traditional rules of 
contract interpretation, and specifically, insurance policy interpretation. By 
construing the policy according to the rules of grammar, with attention given to 
the intent of the parties, the Second Circuit complied with the rules of contract 
interpretation. 
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